CVE-2026-99722 Details
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vringh: bound top-level re-entry into indirect tables In __vringh_iov(), the F_INDIRECT branch descends into the indirect table and continues before the descriptor accounting runs. A top-level indirect descriptor is therefore never charged to count. If such a descriptor sets NEXT to point back at itself, returning from the indirect table resumes at the same top-level descriptor, which is again not counted, so the walk never makes forward progress. Because count stays flat and indirect_count is reset to 0 on every return to the top-level table, neither bound in the loop check trips. A guest can spin the vringh worker at 100% CPU inside __vringh_iov(), an uninterruptible host DoS. Move the descriptor accounting above the indirect switch so that a top-level indirect descriptor is charged one top-level traversal step before the walk descends into its table, bringing this re-entry under the existing vrh->vring.num bound. Each top-level descriptor is still charged at most one step and indirect_count still bounds a single table, so legitimate chains (including the multiple-indirect case in tools/virtio/vringh_test.c) stay within vring.num, while a cyclic indirect descriptor is now rejected with -ELOOP.
Metrics
CVSS 4.0 Severity and Vector Strings:
No CVSS 4.0 data is available for this CVE.
CVSS 3.x Severity and Vector Strings:
No CVSS 3.x data is available for this CVE.
No data available for CVSS Version 2.0 on this CVE.
No SSVC data is available for this CVE.
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Weakness Enumeration
No weakness enumeration is available for this CVE.
Affected Products
No affected product data is available for this CVE.
Change History
1 change record found show changes
| Date | Action | Recorded By |
|---|---|---|
| Nov 20, 2026 | New CVE Received | kernel.org |